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Abstract: In this paper, we defend the main claims of our earlier paper 
“Mental Fictionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” (in The Monist) 
from Gábor Bács’s criticism, which appeared in his “Mental fiction-
alism and epiphenomenal qualia” (in Dialectica). In our earlier paper, 
we tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated the-
ory, so there is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the 
folk psychological discourse. The core of Bács’s criticism consists in 
that our argumentation rests on an equivocation concerning the folk 
psychological concepts of conscious experiences. In our present argu-
mentation, at first, we shortly recapitulate our earlier argumentation 
and Bács’s main objection to it. After that, we argue against the case 
of equivocation, claiming that it rests on a highly implausible and 
unsupported verificationist approach. Lastly, in answering another 
remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of a realist mental fic-
tionalism and conclude that it is an incoherent standpoint. 
Keywords: mental fictionalism; folk psychology; mental antirealism; 
verificationism; conceptual dependence. 
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1. Introduction 
 In his paper “Mental Fictionalism and Epiphenomenal Qualia” (Bács 
2018), Gábor Bács analyzed and criticized our earlier work “Mental Fic-
tionalism as an Undermotivated Theory” in detail. In our earlier paper, we 
tried to show that mental fictionalism is an undermotivated theory, so there 
is no good reason to give up the realist approach to the folk psychological 
discourse. 
 In the present paper, we reply to Bács’s objections. At first, we recapit-
ulate our earlier argumentation shortly. Secondly, we summarize Bács’s 
main objection to it. Thirdly, we argue that this objection fails. Lastly, in 
answering another remark of Bács’s, we discuss the possibility of realist 
mental fictionalism. 
2. What is mental fictionalism and why is it undermotivated?  
 In our earlier paper, we treated mental fictionalism as a theory about 
folk psychological discourse. In this sense, it is a pragmatic theory: it con-
cerns the use of folk psychological sentences, not the content or truth of 
them. Its core thesis states that when we utter sentences of folk psychology, 
we do not assert the truth-conditions of the propositional contents of these 
sentences; that is, we do not use such sentences to describe facts of our 
mental life, rather we use them for other goals. For example, for evaluating 
our fellows’ behavior or expressing emotions, or making as if we asserted 
something (see Márton, Tőzsér 2013, 627-28; and Demeter 2013). 
 To this extent, mental fictionalism is in contrast to those interpretations 
of the discourse which are committed to the fact-stating nature of the use 
of folk psychological sentences. Now, we strongly believe that this later 
realist interpretation is the default view of the pragmatics of this discourse. 
People in their non-philosophical moments take utterances of folk psycho-
logical sentences (mental state attributions to ourselves and to our fellows, 
explanations of their behaviors, etc.) as real fact-stating expressions. We 
normally think of these sentences as such that people use them with the 
intention to describe discourse-independent mental phenomena. Since the 
realist position is the default one, mental fictionalism as an antirealist view 
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must be an error theory: it claims that we are usually in error about the 
pragmatics of the discourse. This is the main point where it differs from the 
other two antirealist approaches, namely eliminativism and nonfactualism. 
Though all three can be viewed as an error theory, the other two versions 
locate the error not in the pragmatic properties of folk psychological sen-
tences, but in their semantic ones. According to eliminativism, we are wrong 
in taking folk psychological sentences mainly true, and according to non-
factualism we are wrong in taking them to be contentful. 
 Since mental fictionalism is an error theory, a proponent thereof has to 
give us a reason why we should not commit ourselves to the realist inter-
pretation of the discourse. She should tell a story why it is misleading to 
see the use of such sentences as stating facts about our real mental life. In 
short, there must be some motivations to endorse mental fictionalism. 
 Earlier we identified two conditions for having such a motivation: (a) One 
can doubt the existence of the entities postulated by folk-psychology, and (b) 
nevertheless, due to certain (mainly practical) considerations, one does not 
want to give up this discourse. Now, we argued that the first condition cannot 
be met. One cannot raise serious doubts about the existence of mental entities 
postulated by folk-psychology. After all, what else would be misleading in the 
default realist approach to folk-psychology? If someone had absolutely no 
doubt about the existence of mental phenomena, why would she want to take 
the use of its sentences as not intending to describe these phenomena? Espe-
cially if she truly does not want to give up the discourse. 
 Of course, on the surface, mental fictionalism is an ontologically neutral 
theory, because it deals only with pragmatics, or the use of folk psycholog-
ical sentences rather than the truth of them. However, one can see now that 
in order to motivate the choice of this theory, one has to commit herself to 
the ontological position that the existence of mental entities is, at least, 
dubious. We think, therefore, that Bács is right when he writes that our 
objection against mental fictionalism “is an objection to mental antirealism 
in general” (Bács 2018, 302; emphasis in the original). All three antirealist 
views are committed negatively to the ontological status of mental phenom-
ena, and fictionalism has the weakest form of this commitment. So, when 
we succeed in proving that it is not tenable, we also show it in the case of 
the other two stronger positions. 
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 Naturally, the essential point of the question is whether we are right in 
claiming that the existence of mental entities does not raise serious doubts. 
In the original paper, we presented two considerations for this thesis. Ac-
cording to the first one, the existence of phenomenally conscious states and 
events cannot be doubted, because they are constituted by the experienced 
qualities during these states and events. In other words, conscious experi-
ences are entirely constituted by the way they appear to us. Therefore, 
because one cannot meaningfully doubt whether what appears to her really 
does appear to her, one also cannot meaningfully doubt the existence of 
conscious experiences. 
 As for the second consideration, conscious experiences are paradigmatic 
mental entities, or they are even the only ones. We think only they can be 
called ‘mental’ in a fundamental and primary sense. As we wrote it: 
According to our natural conviction, if a system or an organism, 
be it as complicated as you like, does not have any conscious 
experiences, that is, it does not undergo events that are some-
thing it is like for it to undergo, and so the world does not appear 
to it in any way, then we tend to treat this system or organism 
as an automat without a mental life. (Márton, Tőzsér 2013, 635) 
 Furthermore, we argued that other ‘mental’ entities count as mental 
only insofar as they bear some appropriate relationship to phenomenally 
conscious experiential states or events. That is, unconscious mental states 
(beliefs, non-occurrent desires and hopes, etc.) and processes can be counted 
as mental insofar as they stand in, for example, an inferential or disposi-
tional relationship to conscious ones. 
 In sum, our argument for the undermotivation of mental fictionalism 
has the following logical structure: 
(1) The existence of conscious experiences does not raise any difficult 
ontological questions. 
(2) Conscious experiences constitute the totality, or at least the para-
digmatic representative core, of mental entities described by folk 
psychology. 
(3) Therefore, the existence of mental entities described by folk psy-
chology does not raise any difficult ontological questions. (1, 2) 
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(4) Mental fictionalism is motivated if and only if (a) the existence of 
mental entities described by folk-psychology raises serious ontolog-
ical questions, and (b) due to certain considerations, we do not 
want to give up this discourse. 
(C) Therefore, the fictionalist interpretation of folk psychology is un-
dermotivated. (3, 4) 
3. Bács’s main objection 
 Bács’s main case against our argumentation, or as he called it the ‘phe-
nomenological objection to mental fictionalism,’ consists in claiming that it 
rests on an equivocation (Bács 2018, 303). He states that the first two 
premises of the argument cannot be jointly true if we stick to one and the 
same concept of conscious experience, and conversely: the premises could 
be equally true just in case the two concepts of conscious experience they 
contain are different. Since equivocation is not allowed in a sound argument, 
one of these premises must be false. 
 According to Bács, the first premise can be true only if by conscious 
experience we mean event-like phenomenally salient entities. In this inter-
pretation, the content of the concept consists entirely in the spatiotemporal 
and phenomenal properties of such events: the phenomenal features of 
a conscious episode determine its type, i.e. whether it is pain, pleasure or 
an itch, while the spatiotemporal features of it determine which token of 
that type it is.  
 However, the second premise can be true if and only if the content of 
the concept of conscious experience in it contains further ingredients, 
namely the causal profile of that state. Bács thinks that folk psychological 
notions of the various conscious experiences entail the typical causal connec-
tions these states or events have. To use one of his examples: the folk psy-
chological concept of itching contains in itself the allusion to the fact that by 
those who have this experience, itching causes scratching or at least the urge 
to do so (Bács 2018, 305). So, folk psychological concepts of conscious expe-
riences are not exhausted by their spatiotemporal and phenomenal properties, 
but “are conceptually linked to their causes and effects” (Bács 2018, 303)—
this is what Bács calls the Conceptual Dependency Thesis (CDT). 
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 His main argument for CDT depends on our practice of attributing con-
scious mental states and events to our fellows.1 We routinely do this and of 
course, in doing so we lean on observed behavior and circumstances as evi-
dence. So far, so good. However, Bács goes further when he maintains that 
there is no conceptually innocent, purely empirical evidence. Any 
evidence must be plugged into the concept of the thing it is evi-
dence for. This should not come as a surprise, because evidence 
is an epistemic notion. What counts as evidence for X depends in 
part on what we know about X, and what we know about X is 
rolled into its concept. A necessary condition for being evidence 
for is this: Y is evidence for X only if X is conceived as (i.e. the 
concept of X means) such a thing that under normal circum-
stances if Y obtains it stands a good chance that X obtains; or 
alternatively, if it is not possible (or highly improbable, or what-
ever) that Y obtains but X fails to obtain. […] So the concept of 
X must include the connection between X and Y, which consti-
tutes the conceptual link, in order for Y to be able to count as 
evidence for X, and therefore, it will include Y. (Bács 2018, 304) 
In short, Bács’s reason for CDT is epistemological. He seems to think that 
the content of a predicate incorporates the way we get to know whether the 
predicate is instantiated in a certain context. 
 Let us turn to the first premise of our argument, i.e. the claim that the 
existence of conscious experiences does not raise any difficult ontological 
questions and see whether it can be true if we understand the notion of 
‘conscious experience’ as involving CDT. Bács writes that “if conscious  
                                                 
1  There is a further, minor argument that aims to support CDT in Bács’s paper 
which alludes to linguistic evidence. There are a lot of expressions in natural lan-
guage which refer to conscious experiences—sensations, perceptual states—which 
name the part of the body where the causes of these conscious states occurred, or 
the typical behavior caused by the states. However, as Bács himself hastily adds, 
this linguistic evidence is very weak, since “it is not always a good idea to take the 
meaning of ordinary expressions at face value” (Bács 2018, 304). We concur in this 
question: one should not draw metaphysical conclusions from the meanings of natu-
ral linguistic expressions, unless one also wants to achieve serious astronomical in-
sights from the expression “the Sun comes up.” 
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experiences are not entirely constituted by qualia [but also by causal con-
nections], then the indubitable existence of qualia does not imply the indu-
bitable existence of conscious experiences” (Bács 2018, 306). Causal rela-
tions are—at least according to most views of causation—empirical and are 
not, contrary to their phenomenological features, exhausted by their ap-
pearance to a subject. For this reason, one can be easily wrong about their 
existence. So, if a conscious experience is present just in case its usual causal 
connections are also present, then the existence of conscious experiences is 
by no means indubitable. 
 Bács supports this claim with a thought-experiment of the usual Twin-
Earth kind. His Twin-Earth is a Leibnizian one, where conscious experiences 
of the inhabitants of this planet are causally totally isolated. They do not 
have any causal connections, including the ones our phenomenally identical 
counterpart conscious experiences have. However, notwithstanding this sit-
uation, the inhabitants have folk psychology which is exactly the same as 
ours. In their folk psychology there are mental predicates standing for con-
scious experiences and these include the allusion to causal connections like 
ours—at least according to Bács. From these premises Bács concludes that 
Twin-Earthers cannot make true assertions by these predicates, since they 
stand for nothing, as nothing satisfies the description contented in them. 
 In sum, the alleged equivocation consists in the fact that the first prem-
ise, if true, contains a notion of conscious experience in which there are 
entirely transparent events or states—which is why we cannot be wrong 
about their existence—while the second premise, if true, contains the folk 
psychological notion of conscious experience, which, in turn, is committed 
to CDT. You cannot substitute the two notions in the two premises salva 
veritate, therefore they are different concepts and the case of equivocation 
is sound. 
4. Objections to Bács’s objections 
 We think there is no equivocation in our argument; at least Bács’s ob-
jection does not prove that there is. Let us start with his first consideration, 
namely that folk psychological concepts of conscious experience would in-
volve CDT. 
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 As we saw, his main reason for this thesis consists in the assumption 
that the evidence we lean on when we attribute conscious experiences to 
our fellows are plugged into the very concepts we have of them. That is—
as it can be seen from the above longer quotation—he supposes that the 
epistemic conditions of true attributions are built into the meaning of the 
predicates we use to describe these conscious episodes. This move has 
a strong verificationist flavor—at least to our ears. The case of verification-
ism is supported by the fact that somewhat later (Bács 2018, 305), Bács 
alludes to the learning of folk psychological notions of conscious experiences 
in order to justify CDT, and there he obviously supposes that the meaning 
of a concept entails the circumstances of learning it. 
 Now, as it is well-known, verificationist theories of meaning have to face 
some powerful objections and therefore have not been too popular among 
meaning-theorists over the last sixty years. Intuitively, you need not know 
how to recognize whether a predicate is instantiated in order to understand 
it, and even if you know this, this knowledge is not built into the meaning 
of the predicate. After all, we have not a faint idea how to get to know 
whether a subatomic particle is present in a given context, but nevertheless, 
we think we understand the notion of an electron. Or, we strongly believe 
we do know what dinosaurs are, although we cannot decide whether some 
fossils serve as good evidence for their existence or not. But even for the 
paleontologist who surely possesses this knowledge, the concept of a dino-
saur hardly entails allusion to the fossils. When she speaks about dinosaurs, 
it seems she speaks about animals that lived on Earth more than 65 million 
years ago, and not about present-day fossils. 
 Moreover, Bács manifestly commits himself to applying the verification-
ist theory to folk-psychology. For example, in presenting his argument, he 
writes that “the folk psychological concept of any conscious experience will 
include the behavior characteristic to it as evidence for its presence in oth-
ers” (Bács 2018, 304). He also claims that “the folk psychological concept 
of pain is associated not just with pain sensation, but also with bodily dam-
age causing it and pain behavior it causes” (Bács 2018, 303). What is more, 
he explicitly states that his CDT is analogous to the so-called criterial so-
lution to the problem of other minds, which in turn “also implies that in 
folk psychology mental events are not only causally linked to behavior but 
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conceptually as well” (Bács 2018, 305). Criterial evidence is conventional in 
the sense that it is part of the meaning of a term such as ‘pain;’ that certain 
kinds of behavior count as more or less defeasible evidence for its ascription. 
The criterial solution is therefore also committed to the verificationist the-
ory of meaning to some extent, and therefore, it renders the problem of 
other minds—which posits a gap between the meaning of conscious state 
attributions and the justifications thereof—meaningless rather than solving 
it. 
 As it is also well-known, there are many persuasive counter-arguments 
against such views that take behavioral evidences as built into the contents 
of folk psychological concepts. The most relevant one in our case is Hilary 
Putnam’s famous example of “super-stoics:” 
Imagine a community of ‘super-spartans’ or ‘superstoics’—a com-
munity in which the adults have the ability to successfully sup-
press all involuntary pain behavior. They may, on occasion, ad-
mit that they feel pain, but always in pleasant well-modulated 
voices […] However, they do feel pain, and they dislike it (just as 
we do). [… I]magine a world in which there are not even pain 
reports. I will call this world the ‘X-world’. In the X-world we 
have to deal with ‘super-super-spartans’. These have been super-
spartans for so long, that they have begun to suppress even talk 
of pain. […] They pretend not to know either the word or the 
phenomenon to which it refers. […] Only, of course, they do have 
pains, and they know perfectly well that they have pains. (Put-
nam 1965/2002, 49-50) 
 What these examples show persuasively in our opinion is that there 
could be cases in which the usual causal connections between conscious 
experience (e.g. pain) and its behavioral effects do not hold. And this situ-
ation can be normal in a community or the whole world, so one cannot 
think that the causal connections in question are usual. So, the folk psycho-
logical sentence “X is in pain and X does not show any pain-behavior” does 
not contain any logical or semantic contradiction. Therefore, the folk psy-
chological concepts of conscious experiences have no conceptual connection 
to pain-behaviors, contrary to what Bács assumes. The same can be said 
about the criterial solution to the problem of other minds—at least according 
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to most researchers of the problem. One can coherently conceive of situa-
tions where the allegedly criterial evidence holds, but the conscious episode 
does not occur, or vice versa. The criterial evidence, therefore, has no con-
ceptual link to conscious episodes. There is a gap between observed behavior 
and the unobserved inner states they fail to bridge (see Hyslop 1995, ch. 5. 
and 8). 
 In summary, Bács’s arguments in favor of CDT fails to justify the thesis. 
Naturally, this result does not imply the falsity of CDT—it can be true for 
other reasons. For example, one can hold such a claim as a result of a func-
tionalist conviction. However, there are well-known counter-arguments 
against it which Bács fails to account for. For example, the much-debated 
arguments based on the inverted spectrum thesis or inverted Earth scenar-
ios (whether they are real or counterfactual ones) equally aim to prove that 
conscious mental states and their normal causal inputs and outputs do not 
stand in a tight conceptual relationship (see Shoemaker 1982; Block 1990). 
One can have a red-seeing experience triggered by green objects and fol-
lowed by events and states usually follow green-seeing experiences. Or, to 
use the above-mentioned example of Bács: one can have an itching experi-
ence without feeling any urge to scratch oneself, but rather to do something 
else. The proponents of the argument see no conceptual incoherence in such 
scenarios, even in the case of a whole community. Again, by invoking these 
arguments, we do not want to claim that CDT is definitely false but merely 
that they represent a strong challenge to the thesis, so these arguments 
must be considered by everyone who tends to accept or reject the thesis in 
question. 
 Based on the above considerations, we can safely state that Bács failed 
to justify CDT, that is, the claim that folk psychological notions of con-
scious mental states conceptually involve and therefore entail their causes 
and effects. Because of this failure, Bács did not succeed in showing that 
these notions of folk-psychology cannot refer to conscious experiences as 
those phenomenally transparent, event-like entities we assume them to be. 
 As for his considerations concerning the first premise of our argument, 
we think it is an obvious truth that it cannot be right if we read the concept 
of conscious experience as involving CDT. Bács is right in claiming that if 
the allusion to causal connections is plugged into the concepts of conscious 
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experience, the existence thereof is by no means indubitable. We think it is 
common sense, and therefore we completely agree with Bács about this. 
Clearly, we have not been persuaded that the folk psychological notion of 
conscious experience really involve CDT, so nothing seem to threatens the 
truth of our first premise. 
 However, we think his Twin-Earth scenario is somewhat misleading, be-
cause it contains a highly implausible assumption and therefore, his argu-
ment based thereon is not persuasive either. Our problem is the following: 
Bács’s scenario presupposes that the introduction and development of 
Twin-Earth folk-psychology has run its course entirely independently of the 
phenomenal states the Twin-Earthers had. As if the semantic properties of 
their folk psychological predicates would have nothing to do with the phe-
nomenal states they undergo. This is the feature of the thought experiment 
which seems most implausible to us. We cannot believe that the introduc-
tion of these predicates was by pure stipulation. Rather, it is much more 
plausible that the intention of the first users of these terms aimed to name 
the very phenomenal features they experienced. These experiences were 
there and were salient at the time of their introductory use. We think that 
various kinds of conscious experiences are natural kinds, so the predicates 
in question are natural kind terms. Therefore, if one accepts this plausible 
reading of the scenario, one has to conclude that these terms do refer to the 
phenomenal states Twin-Earthers undergo. Of course, Twin-Earthers are 
wrong in thinking about these states as having causal connections. They 
have false beliefs about the nature of their experiences, but they can talk 
about them successfully.2 In short, we think that in the plausible reading of 
the scenario Bács is wrong when he states that “there are no *pains* on 
Twin-Earth” (Bács 2018, 306; *pain* is the Twin-Earthian folk psycholog-
ical counterpart concept to our concept of PAIN). There are indeed *pains* 
on Twin-Earth, namely the conscious experience to which this concept re-
fers, that is, the experience which was present at the time the term was 
introduced. For the same reason we think Bács is wrong when he writes the 
following:  
                                                 
2  We think our reading of the scenario is the one which is in harmony with the 
original point of Putnam’s Twin-Earth example and the argument based on it. See 
(Putnam 1975; and also Kripke 1972/1980). 
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So, just as in the standard case of ‘Water’ which fails to refer to 
the liquid found on Twin-Earth because it is not H2O (Putnam 
1975), ‘Pain’ would fail to refer to what feels like pain on Twin-
Earth because it is causally not responsible for pain behavior. 
(Bács 2018, 308) 
 In this passage, it remains ambiguous which language the term ‘pain’ 
belongs to. If we mean it in harmony with Bács’s scenario, it must belong 
to Twin-Earther’s language. In that case, it is analogous to the meaning of 
the term ‘water’ also of the language of Twin-Earthers. And the Twin-
Earthian term ‘water’ surely refers to Twin-Earthian water, even if they 
would falsely think it is composed of two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms. 
The same is true for the Twin-Earthian term (and concept) of ‘pain.’3 
                                                 
3  There is a possible complication here concerning the epiphenomenal nature of 
Twin-Earthian conscious experiences. Someone might object to the story we de-
scribed that because these phenomenal states are causally impotent, they cannot 
cause the introduction of any term or the intention to introduce one. However, we 
think if it is indeed a problem, it is not just our problem; rather it is also a problem 
for Bács. At the end of his paper, he presents some supposedly false propositions 
from Twin Earth folk-psychology which attribute causal connections to the phenom-
enological states the inhabitants of this planet have. The only natural reading of 
these propositions, we think, is the one in which by uttering or thinking these prop-
ositions, Twin-Earthers speak or think about their phenomenological states. For ex-
ample, one of Bács’s example is the proposition: “Peter did not go into the water 
because he was *afraid* of sharks” (Bács 2018, 307). We agree with him that this 
proposition is false, because the phenomenal state Peter has has no causal effect, so 
it cannot cause his reluctance to go into the water. However, as Bács himself 
acknowledges, “Peter did feel something which was phenomenologically like the feel-
ing of fear” (Bács 2018, 307), and the natural reading of the sentence is the one in 
which Peter has false beliefs about this feeling. But then, it seems the only plausible 
explanation of this fact commits him to the view that this phenomenally salient state 
caused Peter’s thought. Even in the case of Bács’s last example, “There exists *anx-
iety*” (Bács 2018, 308), the natural reading is the same again, namely that the 
utterer of this sentence (probably a Twin-Earthian philosopher) was speaking about 
her phenomenal state, just wrongly subsumed it under the concept *ANXIETY*, 
because it has no causal connections. However, it sounds highly paradoxical if we 
consider how she can get this thought. If her phenomenal state is indeed epiphenom-
enal, how can she think about it? In conclusion, if the epiphenomenal nature of Twin 
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 In summary, we agree with Bács that one can be wrong about the ex-
istence of causal connections and, therefore, the first premise of our argu-
ment cannot be right if we read the concept of conscious experience as 
involving CDT. Only we think the argument he presents for this statement 
is not persuasive. All in all, we think we have shown that Bács’s case of 
equivocation is not sound: the two premises can be jointly true with the 
same reading of ‘conscious experience,’ namely the one which describes 
them as simple spatiotemporal entities with phenomenal properties. There-
fore, his counter-argument against our phenomenological objection fails. 
5. Is there a really realist fictionalist position? 
 There is a further possible objection to our position, i.e. that the ac-
ceptance of mental fictionalism is undermotivated. It is based on the possi-
bility of a realist fictionalist position, which, while acknowledging the ex-
istence of propositional attitudes, claims that the folk psychological expla-
nations containing these attitudes are fundamentally flawed, and this fea-
ture of the discourse would motivate the fictionalist approach. This objec-
tion is presented in a somewhat sketchy way by Bács and was also consid-
ered by us in our original paper. As he puts it: 
Folk psychological explanations in terms of propositional attitude 
attributions are fundamentally flawed not because propositional 
attitudes do not exist, but because propositional attitudes cannot 
meet important conceptual and methodological requirements for 
figuring in explanations—for example, because propositional at-
titudes are individuated by the very behaviors they are meant to 
explain, or because propositional attitudes are attributable on 
normative grounds rather than empirical facts. But we cannot 
                                                 
Earth phenomenal states makes our scenario inconsistent, it will make Bács’s sce-
nario inconsistent as well, since otherwise how can the inhabitants of this strange 
planet think or speak about their phenomenal states, even if wrongly? We think 
what this problem really shows is how problematic it is to conceive of epiphenomenal 
conscious experiences coherently. For more on this problem see (Shoemaker 1975; 
Chalmers 1996, 172-209). 
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hope to purge propositional-attitude discourse from everyday life. 
Therefore, our best option is to go fictionalist. […] This would be 
the realist fictionalist’s way. The realist fictionalist is someone 
who takes some discourse as a fiction without disputing the ex-
istence of its subject matter. (Bács 2018, 302; emphasis in the 
original) 
 Although in our earlier paper we considered this objection as a real and 
serious challenge, we changed our minds by now. We cannot see realist 
fictionalism as a real theoretical possibility. 
 Let us start by asking the question: what could be one’s reason to 
acknowledge the existence of propositional attitudes? We think there are 
two possible answers: a) one could have only experiential, i.e. explanation-
independent reasons to believe in the existence of propositional attitudes; 
and b) the only reason at hand could be following Quine’s dictum, namely 
that one has to believe in the existence of only those entities which play 
a role in successful theoretical explanations or explanatory strategies. So, 
according to the first option, propositional attitudes are the kinds of entities 
that are phenomenally salient or, at least, appropriately related to phenom-
enally salient mental episodes. On the other hand, according to the second 
option, propositional attitudes are entities of a theoretical kind. In the first 
case, one has reason to believe in the existence of propositional attitudes if 
and only if one has appropriate experiences, while in the second case, if and 
only if there are successful theoretical explanations at hand in which prop-
ositional attitudes play a role. 
 Applying these two options, we can delineate the logical landscape of 
possible positions. There are four theoretical positions according to how one 
answers the relevant questions in the two options. By the first option, this 
question asks whether there are appropriate experiences of propositional 
attitudes, while in the second option, the question asks whether there is 
a successful explanation which appeals to them. Let us see these possibilities 
and what follows from them concerning the alleged realist fictionalist posi-
tion. 
 If you choose the first option, you have to decide whether you think 
there really are explanation-independent experiential reasons to acknowledge 
the existence of propositional attitudes. If your answer is positive, then you 
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will have good experiential reasons to believe in propositional attitudes. So, 
you are surely a realist about them. Furthermore, you do not want to give 
up folk psychological discourse tout court. So, why be a fictionalist? Natu-
rally, you can think that there are some bad explanations in folk-psychology 
(they may have weak explanatory power, falsified predictions or results 
etc.), and indeed, you may be right about this. However, in such a situation, 
you would be motivated to improve folk-psychology and not to choose fic-
tionalism. That is, you would try to present better explanations, more exact 
predictions, etc. using the same propositional attitude terms. Indeed, cur-
rent psychology seems to do exactly this. It seems very implausible to us to 
think that in this situation you would be inclined to take the usage of sen-
tences containing propositional attitudes as non-fact-stating ones. In sum, 
in the case of this position, you will have no reason to opt for realist fic-
tionalism, because you will have no reason to choose fictionalism at all. 
 If you think there are no good experiential reasons for accepting the 
existence of propositional attitudes, or you think it is dubious whether there 
are, then you will have indeed ontological doubts about the existence of 
propositional attitudes. So, you claim that propositional attitudes are phe-
nomenally salient, experiential kinds of entities (or, at least, are appropri-
ately connected to such kind of entities), for the existence of which there 
are no theoretical reasons, but you think there are no experiential reasons, 
either. Therefore, you are not a realist about propositional attitudes, a for-
tiori you cannot be a realist mental fictionalist. It is that simple. 
 Let us now turn to the other main option, i.e. the one which follows 
Quine’s dictum. Of course, you have to choose again whether you think 
these explanations or explanatory strategies succeed or not. 
 If your answer is positive, then we will think again that there is no 
reason to be a realist fictionalist. The situation is very similar to (1): you 
have good reason to believe in the existence of propositional attitudes and 
you do not want to give up folk-psychology. Moreover, in this case you 
think that—at least the majority of—folk psychological explanations are 
good ones. So, apparently you have every reason to be a realist about the 
existence of propositional attitudes, but you have absolutely no motivation 
to accept the fictionalist approach. The fact that the only reason to 
acknowledge propositional attitudes is that they play a role in successful 
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folk psychological explanations does not offer any motivation for giving up 
the default realist interpretation of the pragmatics of this discourse. You 
can say that it motivates you to take propositional attitudes as theoretical 
entities, but why should we not use sentences containing terms of theoreti-
cal entities to state facts? For example, one can plausibly argue that genes 
are explanation-dependent theoretical entities, but it would be absurd to 
conclude from this that evolutionary biologists do not use sentences con-
taining the term ‘gene’ to state real facts. 
 A good illustration of this position would be that of Dennett’s. He fa-
mously holds that we have to posit propositional attitudes only because of 
the success of the intentional strategy in explaining the behavior of our 
fellows. And, at the same time, he explicitly denies to be a mental fiction-
alist. As he puts it: 
Some instrumentalists have endorsed fictionalism, the view that 
certain theoretical statements are useful falsehoods, and others 
have maintained that the theoretical claims in question were nei-
ther true nor false but mere instruments of calculation. I defend 
neither of these varieties of instrumentalism; as I said when first 
I used the term above: “people really do have beliefs and desires, 
on my version of folk psychology, just as they really have centers 
of gravity.” (Dennett 1987b, 72; the first two emphases are in the 
original, the third one is ours) 
 Of course, there are cases where folk psychological explanations, or, as 
he calls it, “the intentional stance” does not work because of the failure of 
the assumption of rationality. However, it is crucial that in these cases 
Dennett does not want to maintain the intentional, i.e. folk psychological 
discourse. As he puts it: “This is not to say that we are always rational, 
but that when we are not, the cases defy description in ordinary terms of 
belief and desire” (Dennett 1987a, 87; emphasis is ours). In such situations, 
we have to step back and apply other kinds of explanations. 
 The last possibility is the one where you think that there could be only 
explanation-dependent reasons to acknowledge propositional attitudes, but 
you also think that these explanations are flawed. In this situation, the only 
rational conclusion, we think, is that there are no propositional attitudes. 
What else could you think? If you take the explanations in question as 
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unsuccessful and, at the same time, you also think that propositional atti-
tudes are theoretical entities whose existence depends on the success of the 
explanations they take part in, then you will have no other logical option 
but to deny the existence thereof. So, if that would be the reason to be 
a fictionalist, it is indeed based on ontological doubts. Consequently, you 
cannot be a realist about propositional attitudes, a fortiori, you cannot 
reasonably choose realist mental fictionalism. The presence of ontological 
doubts is explicitly stated by a committed fictionalist, namely Demeter in 
the following way: 
Folk psychology represents agents in a way similar to how some 
fictions represent the world: in a way they are not, and—as folk 
psychology does not state facts—cannot be. In this sense folk 
psychology is a tool for making Escherian representations. 
Escher’s Drawing Hands, for example, is not a representation of 
hands drawing one another, but a representation as if hands were 
drawing one another—as if it were possible. (Demeter 2013, 497) 
In other words, according to Demeter, folk psychological sentences are 
about impossible states of affairs, so they cannot exist. What is this if not 
a radical ontological doubt about propositional attitudes? 
 To conclude, Bács’s objections did not persuade us that our earlier ar-
gumentation against mental fictionalism was wrong. We still think our 
“phenomenological objection” does show that mental fictionalism is under-
motivated. Moreover, we think that the realist fictionalist approach men-
tioned by Bács is not even a consistent standpoint, therefore it can hardly 
motivate the acceptance of mental fictionalism, too. 
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